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The indictment and arrest of Charles Taylor for war crimes and crimes against humanity 
committed while Taylor was President of Liberia mark a significant development in the ac-
countability of Heads of State. Yet the process by which the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
indicted Taylor and then attempted to have him arrested and delivered to the Court, as well 
as the Appeals Chamber’s analysis of the legality of the indictment, revealed serious flaws 
and deficiencies. The Appeals Chamber misconstrued the legal foundation of the Special 
Court in deciding that Taylor, as a sitting Head of State, was not entitled to immunity from 
the process of the Special Court. Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber failed to distinguish 
between personal and functional immunities. The author argues that it would have been 
preferable, from a legal point of view, had the Appeals Chamber dismissed the indictment 
as a violation of Taylor’s personal immunity as a sitting Head of State and allowed a future 
indictment to go forward when Taylor no longer enjoyed such immunity. Whatever the legal 
weaknesses of the Appeals Chamber’s decision on the indictment, Taylor’s arrest under-
scored the structural limits on hybrid courts such as the Special Court, which is not able to 
effectively project any legal authority or influence beyond the borders of its host State.
INTRODUCTION
On Monday, April 3, 2006, Charles Taylor became the first former African Head of 
State to come before an international criminal tribunal, jointly established by the 
UN and one of its members, for the alleged commission of international crimes on 
the territory of that State.1 For nearly three years, Taylor had been living in exile in 
southern Nigeria after being forced to resign the Presidency of Liberia and flee the 
rebel insurrections in Monrovia and his indictment for war crimes by the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone. At that time, the international community had decided that 
putting Charles Taylor out of the reach of the Special Court was a price worth pay-
ing for peace and stability in Liberia. Charles Taylor appeared to be yet another 
brutal warlord allowed to decompose into the archives of history without ever an-
swering for his alleged crimes. 
In March 2006, Nigeria finally agreed to the request of the newly-elected President 
of Liberia, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, to hand over Taylor to the Special Court—or, more 
accurately, to repatriate Taylor to Liberia where he would be arrested by the United 
Nations and transferred to Freetown.2 The Special Court, whose inability to pros-



















Ontario, he spent three years working and travelling in various parts of North America, Europe, Asia, and 


















































ecute any of the major rebel leaders had seriously jeopardised its domestic legiti-
macy, finally had its man—the man who could lift the Court out of its mediocrity 
and into the realm of the historic. 
The process that finally delivered Charles Taylor to the Special Court highlights 
an underlying theme of this paper: the Special Court, as an institution, is unable to 
effectively project its influence or authority beyond Sierra Leone. This is not to sug-
gest that the Special Court had been idle in attempting to secure Taylor; in fact, it 
had been quite active in bringing political pressure to bear on Nigeria and lobbying 
for a binding resolution of the Security Council, demanding that Taylor be turned 
over to the Court. In the end, however, it was a political process completely external 
to the Court that delivered Taylor to Sierra Leone. As a hybrid tribunal without a 
Chapter VII mandate or the financial and political resources to effectively secure in-
ternational support and cooperation, the Special Court’s influence was negligible. 
Charles Taylor’s trial raises a myriad of difficult legal issues, including the extent of 
immunity for acts committed by a former Head of State while in office, the legality 
of Taylor’s arrest and transfer by the United Nations to the Special Court, and his 
subsequent transfer for trial to the Netherlands. This paper, however, will look back 
to the summer of 2003—when Charles Taylor became the first incumbent Head of 
State in history to have his indictment and attempted arrest upheld by a judicial 
body—and evaluate the inability of the Special Court to arrest and prosecute him. 
It will argue that the judicial sanctioning of Taylor’s indictment and arrest warrant 
while he was President of Liberia was wrongly decided and sets an unfortunate 
precedent for international criminal law. In relying on a poorly articulated excep-
tion to the law of sovereign immunity from the International Court of Justice’s de-
cision in Congo v. Belgium, the Appeals Chamber of the Special Court incorrectly 
seized upon the international nature of the Court and upheld the indictment.3 In 
doing so, it compounded the frailties of the court’s decision and misconstrued the 
legal foundation and nature of the Special Court.  
Parts I and II of this paper will provide the necessary context by looking at the 
events surrounding the indictment and attempted arrest of Charles Taylor and the 
current status of Heads of State in international law. Part III will critically assess the 
Appeals Chamber’s decision upholding the legality of the indictment and arrest 
warrant. It will argue that the decision was wrongly decided and failed to demon-
strate how the Special Court could disregard the immunity enjoyed at customary 
international law by Charles Taylor as the President of Liberia. Part IV will then 
evaluate the Special Court’s effort to secure Taylor’s arrest while travelling to Ghana 
for peace negotiations in June of 2003. This section concludes that the release of the 
indictment and arrest warrant while Taylor was in Ghana was not only unlawful, 
but also counterproductive with respect to both the peace process and the cam-
paign to prosecute Taylor. The paper highlights the intersection of politics with 
international criminal law and the competing demands the two placed on Charles 
Taylor and the war in Liberia: while politics pursued peace, law sought justice and 
individual responsibility for grave violations of human rights. Finally, this paper 
concludes by looking at the current state of international law from a regime per-
spective. It argues that international criminal law is characterized by multiple le-
gal regimes in which the law of Head of State immunity does not enjoy uniform 
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application. The central weakness of the Appeals Chamber decision is its failure 
to demonstrate how the regime created by the Special Court includes Liberia and 
how its constitutive instrument removes the immunity enjoyed by Charles Taylor 















Charles Taylor returned to Liberia on Christmas Eve, 1989. Six years earlier Taylor 
had fled to the United States amidst allegations of embezzling government money. 
He was subsequently arrested and detained, but, while awaiting extradition, man-
aged to escape from prison and go underground. It is widely believed that Taylor 
received military training under Colonel Qaddafi in Libya, where he met Foday 
Sankoh, future leader of the Sierra Leone rebel group the Revolutionary United 
Front (RUF).
Charles Taylor’s return to Liberia plunged the country into a factional civil war 
that lasted the better part of seven years. In 1997, Charles Taylor was elected Presi-
dent, capturing 75 percent of the national vote and putting a temporary end to 
the conflict. Two years later, however, civil war resumed when a new insurrection 
calling itself “Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy” (LURD) began a 
campaign to oust Taylor from power. Over the next three years, LURD slowly con-
solidated its control over northern Liberia. In 2003, another rebel group, the Move-
ment for Democracy in Liberia, emerged and made rapid gains through the south 
of Liberia. With war descending on the capital, Taylor agreed, at the behest of many 






In March of 1991, Foday Sankoh, who had taken part in Charles Taylor’s initial in-
cursion into Liberia, led a group of dissidents and fighters loyal to Taylor into Sierra 
Leone. The RUF began attacking villages and forcibly recruiting soldiers (many of 
them children). They eventually gained control over the rich mineral resources of 
eastern Sierra Leone. By 1995, the RUF had descended on Freetown. A group of 
mercenaries hired by the military-controlled government of Sierra Leone managed 
to beat the RUF back to the border regions so elections could be held in April of 
1996. Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, a former diplomat, was elected President, marking the 
return of civilian rule to Sierra Leone. President Kabbah negotiated his first of two 
peace agreements with the RUF in Abidjan on November 30, 1996.4 However, Presi-
dent Kabbah was overthrown within the year by a military coup, led by Johnny 
Paul Koroma, calling itself the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). The 
AFRC invited Foday Sankoh and the RUF to form a governing body called the Su-






















































See The Prosecutor against Charles Ghankay Taylor (7 March 2003) SCSL-2003-01-I, Amended Indictment (Special 
Court for Sierra Leone, The Prosecutor), online: The Special Court for Sierra Leone (www.sc-sl.org). 
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President Kabbah in 1998. Fierce fighting continued, however, and on January 6, 
1999, the RUF swarmed into Freetown. Over the next three weeks, for the first time, 
the world’s attention focused on the embattled capital as thousands of innocent 
civilians were brutally raped, mutilated, and murdered.6 
A second round of peace talks between President Kabbah and Foday Sankoh led to 
an agreement signed in Lomé on July 7, 1999. The Lomé Accord brought the RUF 
into the national government and installed Foday Sankoh as Vice President. It also 
called for the establishment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation, UNAM-
SIL, to assist the parties in carrying out the provisions of the agreement.7 However, 
the RUF violated the agreement by kidnapping UNAMSIL personnel, stealing am-
munitions, and renewing attacks on civilians. On May 8, 2000, the RUF killed as 
many as twenty people who had gathered outside Sankoh’s home to protest against 
the RUF’s violations of the Lomé Accord. As a result, Sankoh and many of the sen-










In the face of this rapidly deteriorating security situation, President Kabbah wrote 
to the United Nations, requesting its help in creating an appropriate judicial forum 
in which to try the perpetrators of the gravest atrocities.8 The Security Council re-
quested that the Secretary-General negotiate with the government of Sierra Leone 
to create an independent special court with jurisdiction over persons “who bear the 
greatest responsibility” for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other seri-
ous violations of international law.9 After several meetings with the government of 
Sierra Leone the Secretary-General recommended a court be established by agree-
ment between the UN and Sierra Leone, thus creating a “treaty-based sui generis 
court of mixed jurisdiction and composition.”10 Composed of both national and 
international staff, judges, and lawyers, this court would have jurisdiction over 
both international crimes and crimes under domestic law and primacy over Sierra 
Leonean courts. 
In early 2002, the United Nations and Sierra Leone signed a final agreement, which 
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hybrid composition, more similar to the International Criminal Court (ICC) than to 
the ad hoc tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda (ICTY and ICTR).12
The process establishing the Special Court was a calculated departure from the ap-
proach taken in establishing the ICTY and ICTR. Neither the former Yugoslavia nor 
Rwanda was consulted when the ad hoc tribunals were created. Additionally, those 
tribunals’ statutes were drafted by the UN Secretariat and adopted by Security 
Council Chapter VII resolutions, essentially making the tribunals subsidiary organs 
of the UN.13 In creating the Special Court for Sierra Leone, there was a sense that a 
treaty-based court enjoying the consent and support of the host State would enjoy 
greater legitimacy, raise fewer legal concerns, and function more effectively.14 Per-
haps most importantly, the international community did not have the wherewithal 
for the creation of another expensive international criminal tribunal.15 Against the 
advice of the Secretary-General, the Special Court was to be funded entirely by vol-
untary contributions, a source of constant uncertainty that to this day “infects all of 
the Special Court’s activities.”16 These concerns led one commentator, in an oft-cited 
phrase, to dub the Special Court a “shoestring” court.17
The decision to establish a treaty-based court with the consent of the territorial State 
was, in many respects, returning full-circle to the International Military Tribunal 
created after World War II. In the wake of the Cold War, a renaissance of sorts oc-
curred in international criminal justice; the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugosla-
via and Rwanda were legal responses to the failure of the international community 
to effectively react to the conflict in Yugoslavia or prevent genocide in Rwanda. 
However, by the turn of the century, the Security Council had reached a point of 
“tribunal fatigue.”18 To some, the ad hoc tribunals were simply more work than 
they were worth. This weighed heavily on the UN when considering responses to 
conflicts in Sierra Leone, Kosovo, East Timor, and Cambodia. These countries were 
caught between the international community’s dissatisfaction with the ICTY and 
ICTR and the as-yet inoperative ICC. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to 
argue what sort of judicial forum should or could have been established for Sierra 
Leone, the point is not merely academic. The decision of the Security Council to 
establish a hybrid, treaty-based court has had direct repercussions on the ability 
of the Special Court to secure Charles Taylor and the perceived success of interna-
tional criminal justice in Sierra Leone.  
Since the constitutive instrument of the Special Court is a treaty and not, like the ad 
hoc tribunals, a Security Council resolution made pursuant to Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter, the Special Court has primacy over the national courts of Sierra Leone 
but not over the courts of other States. The Special Court is empowered to issue 
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the surrender of a person from another State or the authority to induce compliance 
with any such request.19 This means that evidence, witnesses, or indictees that are 
outside the territorial boundaries of Sierra Leone are, without cooperation from 
other States, simply beyond the reach of the Special Court.20 Such a problem was, in 
fact, foreseen by the Secretary-General when he wrote in his report: “the Security 
Council may wish to consider endowing it with Chapter VII powers for the specific 
purpose of requesting the surrender of an accused from outside the jurisdiction 
of the Court.”21 The Secretary-General likely had Charles Taylor in mind when he 
made this suggestion. The Security Council has never taken this advice, despite a 
political campaign by the Prosecution in May of 2005 to get a Chapter VII resolution 









In May of 2002, free and fair elections were held in Sierra Leone and Ahmed Te-
jan Kabbah was re-elected president. UNAMSIL was firmly in place and a modest 
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration campaign had finished its work; 
peace, it seemed, had finally returned to Sierra Leone. With the Special Court es-
tablished, the prosecution began the work of sorting through a tortuous civil war 
notorious for its sheer brutality. In March of 2003, the bulk of the indictments were 
issued against high-ranking members of both the rebel and government forces in 
Sierra Leone. On March 7, Judge Bankole Thompson signed Charles Taylor’s indict-
ment, but it was kept sealed because, as the prosecution later explained, Taylor was 
a sitting Head of State and under a UN Security Council travel ban.23 Two months 
later, when Taylor agreed to attend peace talks in Accra, the prosecution decided to 
seek Ghana’s cooperation in arresting and transferring Taylor to the Special Court. 
On June 4, the Office of the Prosecutor reportedly hand-delivered the relevant docu-
ments to the Ghanaian High Commission in Freetown and transmitted copies elec-
tronically to the Ghanaian Minister for Foreign Affairs in Accra. There is confusion 
as to whether Ghana in fact received the documents and what, if any, official re-
sponse they had to them.24 Nonetheless, hours after the indictment had been made 
19 
    Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, supra note 10 at para. 10; 
























and Sam Bockarie were indicted by the Special Court in March of 2003 while reportedly living outside of Sierra 
Leone. In fact, Prosecutor David Crane publicly accused Taylor of harbouring them. Within months, both were 


















































His whereabouts are a frequent topic of discussion in Sierra Leone as many people believe he will return once 
the UN and the Special Court leave.
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However, when a BBC reporter on the ground in Accra questioned the Ghanaian Foreign Minister, Monie 
Captain, on the arrest warrant, he reportedly replied, “It’s not a problem—we don’t recognize that court.” He 
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public and the arrest warrant reportedly sent to Ghana, a surreal spectacle unfolded 
in Accra: Taylor, now an indicted war criminal, sat on stage in a conference room 
packed by Ghanaian police and army personnel, with the special representative of 
the United Nations and the Presidents of South Africa, Ghana, and Sierra Leone at 
his side. The indictment was never mentioned and Taylor received a police escort 
back to the airport, where he boarded a government plane for the return flight to 
Monrovia.25  
The seventeen-count indictment against Charles Taylor accused him of encourag-
ing, supporting, and financing the RUF and the joint criminal enterprise between 
the RUF and the AFRC. The indictment alleged that Taylor trained, armed, and 
financed the armed insurrection and acted in concert with Foday Sankoh and other 
members of the RUF and AFRC in order to obtain access to the mineral wealth of 
Sierra Leone and to destabilize the State.26 The indictment held Charles Taylor in-
dividually responsible pursuant to Article 6(1) of the Statute of the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone for planning, instigating, ordering, and aiding and abetting in the plan-
ning, preparation, or execution of the crimes. In addition, or in the alternative, the 
indictment alleged that Taylor was individually responsible under the doctrine of 
command responsibility pursuant to Article 6(3).27 The counts included terrorizing 
the civilian population, imposing collective punishment on the civilian population, 
unlawful killings, sexual and physical violence, abductions, forced labour, attacks 
on UNAMSIL personnel, and the use of child soldiers.
The civil war in Liberia continued after Taylor returned from Ghana. The interna-
tional community—particularly the United States, which debated sending peace-
keepers into Monrovia—renewed diplomatic and political negotiations with the 
embattled President. It was clear to the international community that peace could 
not be had while Taylor remained in power. At the peace conference in Accra, Tay-
lor had stated that he was prepared to resign only if certain conditions, such as the 
installation of a peacekeeping force, were met. On August 11, 2003, Charles Tay-
lor resigned the Presidency and boarded a Nigerian government plane bound for 
Lagos.28 A West African peacekeeping force entered Liberia followed by a limited 
deployment of U.S. Marines and a UN peacekeeping force in October. The details of 
the exile agreement were not made public, but it is generally taken to have included 
a ban on interfering in Liberian politics and, as some Nigerian officials have as-
serted, an agreement that the international community would not pressure Nigeria 







































































    The Prosecutor against Charles Ghankay Taylor, supra note 5 at paras. 26 and 27. The indictment was amended 
to eleven counts (from the original seventeen) on March 16, 2006, perhaps in anticipation of Nigeria’s consent to 































    Report of the Secre-










    supra note 23.
282007
Nigeria’s decision to allow Taylor to go into exile was a political deal made with the 
broad support of the international community. While many human rights groups 
and legal scholars have criticized the decision for perpetuating the environment of 
impunity surrounding high-ranking State officials and for undermining the work 
of the Special Court, it is clear that most actors involved felt it was simply the price 
to be paid for bringing peace to Liberia. Even the Prosecutor for the Special Court, 
David Crane, supported the decision, saying “it was the right thing at the time.”30 
The international community has been reluctant to criticize Nigeria for accepting 
Taylor, despite pressure from many non-governmental organizations. In fact, the 
Security Council recently thanked Nigeria for providing for the “temporary stay of 
former President Charles Taylor.” The Security Council’s use of the word “tempo-











Even while Charles Taylor was negotiating the terms of his resignation in the sum-
mer of 2003 he took legal action against the indictment and arrest warrant issued 
against him. On July 23, 2003, Taylor filed a motion with the Special Court for an or-
der quashing the indictment and declaring the arrest warrant and order of transfer 
null and void.31 Two weeks later, on August 4, 2003, the Republic of Liberia brought 
an application before the ICJ to bring proceedings against Sierra Leone in respect 
of the indictment and arrest warrant.32 In both motions, the applicant asserted that 
as the incumbent President of Liberia, Charles Taylor enjoyed absolute immunity 
from criminal prosecution and that the Special Court’s attempt to impose legal ob-






The doctrine of Head of State immunity is vague and unsettled.34 There appears 
to be a clear divergence between treaty and customary international law with re-
spect to the concept and rationale for Head of State immunity. Recent case law 
increasingly recognizes it as a defence, while the statutes of many courts—from the 
International Military Tribunal, to the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda, to the ICC—explicitly remove such immunity defences.35 Even within 
30 
    Lang,
    supra note 22 at 10.
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fense” (2004) 108 Penn State L.R. 899 at 926. 
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these statutory instruments there is a further divergence as to the extent of the im-
munity. While the statues of the ICTY and ICTR retain a limited procedural immu-
nity, the ICC’s enabling statute removes procedural immunity completely. 
The international community’s interests in securing peace on the one hand and pro-
moting responsibility for international crimes and respect for human rights have 
often conflicted in practice. The doctrine of Head of State immunity is no exception 
in this regard: the international community has extended impunity to perpetrators 
of some of the most serious international crimes in order to secure peace and stabil-
ity. 
Historically, Head of State immunity derives from the doctrine of sovereign im-
munity. The Head of State in her person is equated with the State itself and is there-
fore granted the same privileges and immunities accorded to the State.36 In many 
respects, Head of State immunity is analogous to the diplomatic immunity enjoyed 
by members of diplomatic missions in foreign countries.37 Prior to the decision of 
the ICJ in Congo v. Belgium, it was thought to apply to no more than five hundred 
individuals; with the extension of the doctrine by the ICJ to Ministers for Foreign 
Affairs and, arguably, other high-ranking government ministers, the number may 
be much larger.38
Head of State immunity has grown from its roots and can no longer be consid-
ered an absolute immunity. Contemporary international law draws a distinction 
between immunity ratione materiae (functional immunity) and immunity ratione per-
sonae (personal immunity).39 In the former, the act is imputed to the State and not 
to the individual so that this species of immunity constitutes a substantive defence 
to a charge. Functional immunity covers the official acts of most State agents or 
other persons who act on behalf of the State and outlives the discharge of official 
functions. Functional immunity can be invoked in any legal proceeding and may 
protect State officials not entitled to personal immunity.40 
Personal immunity, by contrast, is a procedural defence that renders the State of-
ficial absolutely immune from civil or criminal jurisdiction. It attaches to the person 
by virtue of the position they hold (primarily diplomatic agents, Heads of State, 
Heads of Government, and Ministers for Foreign Affairs) and therefore covers all 
acts—private or official—committed during office or prior to assuming office. How-
ever, personal immunity only attaches to the individual for as long as the person 
remains in office; once she ceases to hold the position, personal immunity no longer 
applies.41 Personal and functional immunity will often coexist and overlap. For ex-
ample, while an individual is in office, she is subject to personal immunity by virtue 




    The Law of State Immunity (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002) at 437; see also O’Neill, 
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one exception—are protected by functional immunity, even after she leaves office.42 
Once she has left office, by contrast, only functional immunity will apply.
The doctrine of Head of State immunity exists for the same reason that the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity exists: one sovereign State does not adjudicate on the 
conduct of a foreign State.43 The prosecution of a Head of State or other State agent 
for official conduct while in office is tantamount to trying and prosecuting the 
state itself and thus disregarding its sovereignty.44 Similarly, personal immunities 
prevent States from interfering in the internal organization of other States for rea-
sons unrelated to the objectives of international criminal justice. More importantly, 
personal immunities ensure that a State official can effectively perform her duties 
while present in a foreign State, without fear of harassment.45 In turn, this helps 
ensure the meaningful participation of States in the international system, promotes 
stability, and maintains peace. In fact, the personal inviolability of a Head of State, 
diplomat or Minister for Foreign Affairs is so essential to the maintenance of peace 
that it has led one commentator to argue persuasively that it must prevail over 
other values such as individual responsibility for “core crimes” and grave viola-
tions of human rights.46
By contrast, it is now well established that there is a customary rule of international 
law lifting functional immunities for war crimes and crimes against peace and hu-
manity as well as torture and other core crimes such as genocide.47 The rule applies 
to most incumbent State officials—except high-ranking State officials protected by 
personal immunity—and all former State officials, including Heads of State.48 The 
rationale for such a rule is simple: the reasons for which immunity is granted do not 
apply to international crimes, which can never be considered official acts, because 
no State can officially commit crimes of this nature.49 The source of this exception 
is Article 7 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, which states that 
an accused’s official position cannot free her from responsibility nor mitigate her 
punishment.50 Similar provisions have been included in the statutes of the ICTY, 
42 
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the ICTR, the ICC, and the Special Court for Sierra Leone. Moreover, the UN Gen-
eral Assembly unanimously affirmed both the principles and the judgments of the 
Nuremberg Tribunals in 1946.51 The Supreme Court of Israel noted this principle 
as part of the law of nations in the Eichmann decision, which held that State agents 
acting in their official capacity are not immune from criminal liability if they com-
mit international crimes.52 More recently the House of Lords in Pinochet held that 
torture, as a jus cogens international crime, could never be considered an official act 
to which functional immunity attached.53 Together these statutory provisions, reso-
lutions, and national cases indicate the crystallisation of a customary rule.54 
A similar customary rule lifting personal immunities for international crimes, how-
ever, does not yet exist in international law. In fact, before national courts, high-
ranking State agents entitled to person immunity remain inviolable and immune 
from prosecution on the strength of the customary rule on personal immunities.55 
While the House of Lords held that Pinochet could not be protected by functional 
immunities as a former Head of State, it confirmed that had he still been president, 
he would have enjoyed personal immunity for all public and private acts, even if 
they constituted international crimes.56 Around the same time, a Spanish court held 
that Fidel Castro, as the sitting Head of State of Cuba, could not be prosecuted for 
international crimes under Spanish law.57 Two years later, France’s Court of Cassa-
tion of Paris accepted a plea of immunity and declined jurisdiction on a charge of 
murder brought against Muammar al-Qaddafi for complicity in the bombing of a 
passenger airplane on the basis of Head of State immunity.58 In 2001, a United States 
court dismissed a civil law suit against President Mugabe of Zimbabwe and his 
Minister for Foreign Affairs and held that they were immune from lawsuit as well 
as service of the process, again based on sovereign immunity.59 Finally, in 2003, the 
Belgian Court of Cassation dismissed a prosecution brought against Ariel Sharon 
because, as Prime Minister of a foreign State, he enjoyed immunity from prosecu-
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exception under customary international law to the rules according immunity and 
inviolability to incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs, and by extension Heads of 
State, where they are suspected of having committed war crimes or crimes against 
humanity.61 
All of these cases dealt with Heads of State indicted or sued before the national 
courts of foreign States based on various applications of universal jurisdiction. If 
the Special Court for Sierra Leone were a domestic court, there would be no sound 
basis upon which one could argue that Charles Taylor was not immune from its 
jurisdiction based on his status as President of Liberia. The gravity of the crimes 
alleged is irrelevant to his personal immunity; as long as Taylor remained President, 
the Special Court had no jurisdiction over him whatsoever. However, the character-
ization of the Special Court as a national court of Sierra Leone is inaccurate. While it 
is not an international court in the sense of the ICTY or the ICTR, the Special Court 
is more like an international court than a domestic court of Sierra Leone. It was this 
very point that the Appeals Chamber of the Special Court seized on when they held 
that Charles Taylor did not enjoy personal immunity from its jurisdiction. In doing 
so, it followed a questionable obiter dictum of the ICJ in the Congo v. Belgium deci-
sion, wherein the Court stated that incumbent or former officials who enjoy person-
al immunity may be prosecuted before certain international courts.62 It is necessary, 
therefore, to consider the reasoning of the ICJ in this regard before analysing the 
Special Court’s conclusion that Taylor did not enjoy personal immunity.
The
    Congo v. Belgium
    Decision
In Congo v. Belgium, the ICJ was asked to resolve a dispute arising from an arrest 
warrant issued by a Belgian judge against the Minister for Foreign Affairs for the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mr. Abdulaye Yerodia, for the alleged commis-
sion of international crimes. The ICJ held that due to the nature of her duties, a 
Minister for Foreign Affairs is one of the categories of State officials protected by 
personal immunity. Ministers for Foreign Affairs are inviolable and immune from 
foreign jurisdiction, as any interference with them would prevent them from exer-
cising the functions of their office.63 The ICJ held that the mere issuance of a war-
rant for Mr. Yerodia’s arrest violated his personal immunity. The conclusion of the 
ICJ has been largely celebrated, but the analytical road that the court traveled and 
two of the exceptions to personal immunity that it articulated have been widely 
criticized.  
Notably absent in the reasoning of the ICJ in Congo v. Belgium is any distinction 
between personal and functional immunities.64 The ICJ correctly concludes that im-
munity from jurisdiction is procedural in nature and does not provide the State offi-
cial with a substantive defence that would exonerate her from criminal responsibil-
ity.65 This statement does highlight the implications of the two different immunities 
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and, given that the case involves a warrant issued against an incumbent Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, it is reasonably clear that the holdings of the Court in the Congo 
decision apply to the personal immunity of State officials. However, the Court’s fail-
ure to explicitly distinguish between personal and functional immunities weakens 
the analytical clout of the decision; while the outcome is sound, the opportunity to 
clarify and sharpen the law of personal immunities was not fully seized.
The bulk of academic criticism of the Congo decision has focused on the four excep-
tions to personal immunity enumerated by the Court.66 The first two exceptions—
that personal immunities do not prevent the prosecution of officials in their own 
country, and that a State may waive the personal immunity of its own officials—are 
sound. However, the Court went on to state that former officials may be prosecuted 
by foreign States for acts committed in a “private capacity” during the official’s 
tenure.67 Finally, the Court says incumbent or former officials “may be subject to 
criminal proceedings before certain international courts, where they have jurisdic-
tion.”68 This is not only inconsistent with the customary rule of international law 
lifting functional immunities for international crimes, but the Court also declined 
to refer to, let alone analyze, the existence of any such rule. The Court then goes on 
to cite as examples the ICTY, the ICTR, and the ICC (specifically, Article 27(2) of the 
Rome Statute). 
The principles enunciated in these last two statements are neither well reasoned 
nor easily reconciled with the existing law of immunity.69 The distinction between 
official and private acts, if accepted as correct, could stall the development of inter-
national criminal law, which has been moving in an opposite direction since World 
War II, and dilute the practical importance of the Pinochet decision.70 To adopt the 
ICJ’s reasoning in the Congo case would make high-ranking State officials who usu-
ally plan and order international crimes immune to prosecution by virtue of their 
status (provided they acted “officially”) while making low-ranking officials who 
actually carry out the order subject to prosecution.71 It would seem reasonable to 
argue that international crimes are rarely, if ever, committed in a private capacity.72 
Thus, one way to reconcile the decision in Congo with the existing law of State im-
munity would be to adopt the reasoning in Pinochet that international crimes can 
never be official acts. As a consequence, State officials would be immune for official 
acts provided that those acts do not constitute core crimes. While this may achieve 
66 Ibid. at para. 61.
67 Ibid. at para. 61
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the same result as a rule lifting functional immunity for international crimes, it is 
not explicit in the Court’s judgment and there is no compelling reason to prefer a 
“private acts” rule over the more elegant and simple rule lifting functional immu-
nity for international crimes.
As discussed below, the ICJ’s statement that personal immunities would not pre-
vent the prosecution of an incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs before certain in-
ternational courts, provided the courts have jurisdiction, was the basis upon which 
the Appeals Chamber of the Special Court for Sierra Leone held that Charles Taylor 
did not enjoy personal immunity. As such, it is the first application of Congo v. Bel-
gium and, given the fact that it denied immunity to a sitting Head of State, will be 
considered a significant contribution to international criminal law. Those who fight 
to end impunity and promote individual responsibility might eagerly celebrate the 
decision, solely because they desire the result. But celebrating the end of impu-
nity—or perhaps more accurately, the end of personal immunity for sitting Heads 
of State—is premature and should be resisted. In relying on the suspect elements 
of the ICJ’s decision in Congo v. Belgium, the Appeals Chamber replicated all of its 
frailties and ambiguities.73 The decision displays confusion over certain areas of 
international law and perpetuates the uncertainty surrounding the present state of 
the law on international immunities—all of which is even more regrettable when 
one considers that the same result could have been achieved through less contro-












The Appeals Chamber’s decision turned primarily on the legal status of the Spe-
cial Court.75 The Chamber highlighted the involvement of the Security Council in 
the foundation of the Special Court and the agreement between the UN and Sierra 
Leone. The absence of a Security Council resolution under Chapter VII was not, on 
its own, determinative of the Special Court’s status. As Sarah Nouwen has argued, 
the finding that the Special Court is an international criminal court is sound, but 
the consequences the Appeals Chamber attached to that finding are contentious.76 It 
may be an international court, but that does not mean its rulings are binding on all 
the members of the UN or that, solely by virtue of it being international, the Court 
can disregard the President of Liberia’s immunity. To achieve that result it must be 
established in law that Liberia has been bound by, or otherwise consented to, the 
jurisdiction of the Special Court and that its constitutive instrument removes the 
customary rule of personal immunity for Heads of State. 
The Appeals Chamber connected the unavailability of personal immunity for Tay-
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reasoning is obvious: an international court would not, like a domestic court, vio-
late the principle of sovereign immunity that one State does not adjudicate on the 
conduct of another State. Since international courts are created by the international 
community and not by the actions of any one State, the principle is not violated. 
Immediately after citing the ICJ’s obiter dictum in the Congo v. Belgium decision, the 
Appeals Chamber endorsed this exact line of reasoning when it wrote:
A reason for the distinction, in this regard, between national courts and in-
ternational courts, though not immediately evident, would appear due to 
the fact that the principle that one sovereign state does not adjudicate on the 
conduct of another state; the principle of state immunity derives from the 
equality of sovereign states and therefore has no relevance to international 
criminal tribunals which are not organs of a state but derive their mandate 
from the international community.78    
According to this view the indictment against President Taylor could be readily 
distinguished from Congo v. Belgium, which involved the issuance of an arrest war-
rant from a domestic court. 
This analysis, while initially persuasive, is problematic and illustrative of the perils 
of relying on the law as stated by the ICJ in the Congo v. Belgium decision. Should it 
matter that the prosecuting State is attempting to exercise its jurisdiction unilater-
ally or through some collective body to which the state has not consented?79 If two 
countries—or a State and an international organization—established a treaty court 
between them, would its characterization as “international” be enough to allow it 
to disregard the rights and privileges enjoyed at customary law by a third State?80 
Surely the sovereign equality of a State not party to such a court would be violated 
if the court attempted to exercise jurisdiction over that State’s highest officials or 
Head of State. 
The difficulty stems from the Appeals Chamber confusion between the internation-
al nature of the Special Court and its legal foundation. While there is no doubt that 
the Special Court has many of the features and characteristics of an international 
court, its legal foundation is that of an agreement between two parties—Sierra Leo-
ne and the UN.81 A fundamental principle of international law is that a treaty only 
binds the parties to the treaty.82 Since the UN is an international organization with 
independent legal personality greater than the sum of its members, the agreement 
between the UN and Sierra Leone is binding on the organization itself and not its 
members, who remain third parties to the agreement.83 
However, the Appeals Chamber conceived of the agreement between the United 
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Nations and Sierra Leone as an agreement between all members of the United 
Nations and Sierra Leone.84 The Appeals Chamber reasoned that the UN Security 
Council identified the situation in Sierra Leone as a threat to international peace un-
der Article 39 of the UN Charter, created the Special Court pursuant to Article 41 of 
the UN Charter, and was thus empowered to call upon member States to aid in the 
implementation of the Special Court. Therefore, the Appeals Chamber concluded, 
when “carrying out its duties under its responsibility for the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security, the Security Council acts on behalf of the members of 
the United Nations.”85 Essentially, the Appeals Chamber attempted to establish the 
legal basis of the Special Court within Chapter VII, implying it was a measure bind-
ing upon all member States. 
With respect, the Security Council did not create the Special Court by way of a 
resolution as it did the ICTY and the ICTR; the Security Council merely author-
ized the Secretary-General to negotiate and enter into an agreement with Sierra 
Leone for the creation of the Special Court. In doing so the Security Council never 
explicitly invoked Chapter VII. The language employed in Resolution 1315 did not 
use classic Chapter VII verbs such as “demand” or “shall” and fell short of “calling 
upon” States to take any measures.86 In fact, the resolution simply “requests” and 
“recommends.”87 There was no apparent intention in any pertinent Security Coun-
cil resolution to create any binding effect. The establishment of the Special Court 
is more appropriately compared to classical, consensual peacekeeping operations, 
which are generally constituted under Chapter VI or somewhere between Chapters 
VI and VII.88 Finally, if the Special Court was truly created through a Chapter VII 
resolution, or at least something akin to one, the Appeals Chamber elected not to 
resolve the issue of Taylor’s immunity on that basis. If the Appeals Chamber had 
established the Special Court as an international criminal court created within the 
framework of Chapter VII, it could have simply relied upon this as the basis for 
rejecting Taylor’s claim.89 But the Appeals Chamber dismissed the claim based on 
the distinction between international and national criminal courts made by the ICJ 
in Congo v. Belgium.
A great deal of the difficulty with the reasoning of the Appeals Chamber can be 
attributed to the fact that the obiter dictum of the ICJ was either an incomplete or 
imprecise statement of the law. It is unclear exactly what the ICJ had in mind; 
was its intention to pronounce that immunities are irrelevant before all interna-
tional courts? If one emphasizes the use of phrases such as “certain international 
courts,” “established pursuant to Security Council resolutions under Chapter VII,” 
and “statute expressly provides” then such a far-reaching conclusion is not easily 
reached.90 As argued above, a court cannot remove rights and privileges enjoyed 
by third parties solely by virtue of the fact that it is “international.” Two additional 
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elements are required:
The statement by the ICJ that international immunities may not be pleaded 
before certain international tribunals must be read subject to the condition (1) 






























is entitled to such immunity before an international tribunal that the state 
concerned has not consented to.91 
Therefore, if an international court is going to remove a right or privilege enjoyed 
by a state or an individual at customary international law, two requirements must 
be met: first, the State must be brought into the regime of that court, and secondly, 
that regime must explicitly provide for the removal of that right or privilege. 
It has already been argued that the first branch of that test cannot be satisfied in this 
case—Liberia has not consented to the Special Court and is not, absent a resolution 
under Chapter VII, bound by the agreement between the UN and Sierra Leone. 
That aside, assuming Liberia has, one way or another, been brought into the in-
ternational regime created by the Special Court, does that regime provide for the 
removal of the personal immunity enjoyed by the President of Liberia at customary 
international law? The question is a live one that has sparked divergent opinions. 
Article 11 of the agreement between the UN and Sierra Leone endows the Special 
Court with an international legal personality. Since its statute compels it to apply 
international law (except as expressly derogated from), the Special Court must ap-
ply the customary international legal rule affording personal immunity for incum-
bent Heads of State. Therefore, if the immunities available at customary law are not 
going to apply before the Special Court, the Statute of the Court must remove them. 
Article 6(2) of the Statute of The Special Court for Sierra Leone states: “The official 
position of any accused person, whether as Head of State or Government or as a 
responsible government official, shall not relieve such person of criminal respon-
sibility nor mitigate punishment.”92 This provision is nearly identical to Article 7 
of the Nuremberg Charter, Article 7(2) of the ICTY statute, Article 6(2) of the ICTR 
statute, and Article 27(1) of the Rome Statute.93 
Article 6(2) of the Special Court’s statute is a replication of the “classic provision” 
limiting the immunity conferred upon Heads of State and other high-ranking of-
ficials it is unclear whether the provision removes both functional and personal 
immunity, or just the former. By contrast, the Rome Statute contains two separate 
immunity provisions: one emphasizing criminal responsibility and a new provi-
sion regarding procedural immunity. Article 27 of the Rome Statute states:
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capacity of a person, whether under national or international law, shall 
not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person.94   
The immunity provisions in the Rome Statute are significantly more robust than the 
“classic provision.” They explicitly refer to two different types of immunities - im-
munity from criminal responsibility (ratione materiae) and special procedural rules 
(ratione personae). The inclusion of a “revolutionary” two-part immunity provision 
in the Rome Statute has led some scholars to conclude that provisions like Article 
6(2) of the Special Court’s statute cover only functional immunity.95 Thus, it is pos-
sible that even if Liberia had been bound by the agreement establishing the Court, 
Charles Taylor would have retained personal immunity as a sitting Head of State 
under customary law.




    Act, has a significantly different provision. Article 29 states: 
“The existence of an immunity or special procedural rule attaching to the official 
capacity of any person shall not be a bar to the arrest and delivery of that person 
into the custody of the Special Court.”96 Arguably, this provision goes further than 
the Statute of the Special Court by removing procedural immunity for State officials 
and dealing explicitly with arrest and detention. Of course, as domestic law, it is 
only applicable in Sierra Leone. While beyond the scope of this paper, it is inter-
esting to note that this provision may remove the personal immunity enjoyed by 
President Kabbah, who has been President of Sierra Leone since his election in 1996. 
President Kabbah has not been indicted by the Special Court, but three high-rank-
ing officials of Sierra Leone’s Civil Defence Force are currently on trial.97 It is dif-
ficult to believe that Kabbah was not involved in the planning and implementation 
of the government resistance to the RUF and AFRC. While there can be little doubt 
that arresting President Kabbah for war crimes would be a politically catastrophic 
decision, it may well be within the legal capacity of the Special Court. 
If all that the “classic provision” in Article 6(2) does is remove functional immuni-
ties for former State officials, it is redundant—or more accurately, it merely codi-
fies customary international law. A former State official facing prosecution for acts 
committed in a private capacity or acts constituting core crimes has no functional 
immunity with regard to those crimes, and thus an interpretation that limits the 
effect of the “classic provision” to functional immunity would not alter customary 
law. Some scholars argue that the strictness of the provision provides for a broader 
interpretation, which could prevent defendants from invoking personal immuni-
94 
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ties.98 Such a literal interpretation of the provision is possible and one could cite it as 
a general rule to the effect that the official position of a defendant may not be relied 
on as a bar to prosecution.99 
However, that position is problematic and is based on circular reasoning. The “clas-
sic provision” in the Nuremberg Principles adopted by the UN General Assembly 
gave rise to the State practice, subsequent codification, and adherence to the cus-
tomary rule lifting functional immunity. So, while it is true that the contemporary 
use of this provision in the statutes of the ICTY, the ICTR, and the Special Court 
merely reflects customary law, it is because of their use and adherence to the pro-
vision that such a rule crystallized. To argue that the provision is now redundant, 
and therefore needs to be expanded, ignores the logic that if the provision was suf-
ficiently broad to remove personal immunity for international crimes in its initial 
conception, then that too should have developed into a customary rule. A survey of 
State practice shows that it has not. Therefore, a State could argue that when it con-
sented to a regime with this provision, it did not believe that the personal immunity 
of its officials had been discarded. The use of a more robust, two-part immunity 
provision in the Rome Statute could be construed as an explicit recognition by those 
States party to the ICC of the limited scope of the “classic provision” and of the ef-
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he enjoyed at the time of his indictment.104 Nor did the Trial Chamber analyze Ar-
























ment is not a valid precedent for the indictment of incumbent Heads of State and is 
an unresolved anomaly in international criminal law.          
By relying on the distinction between national and international courts laid down 
in Congo v. Belgium105, the Appeals Chamber relied excessively on the international 
nature of the tribunal and failed to address the Special Court’s legal foundation and 
the implications of that legal foundation. Liberia has never been brought into the 
regime of the Special Court and is thus not bound by its Statute. Moreover, even if 
Liberia had been, Article 6(2) of the Special Court’s Statute does not remove the per-
sonal immunity of the President of Liberia; it only removes the functional immu-
nity of former officials, eliminating a substantive defence for any acts committed 
during his or her tenure. However, the Appeals Chamber never drew the distinc-
tion between immunities ratione material and ratione personae, nor did it analyze cus-
tomary international law and the possible effect of Article 6(2), concluding only that 















with customary law could only be correct if the Appeals Chamber was referring to 
functional immunity for former State officials, since no rule has developed lifting 
the personal immunity of Heads of State for international crimes.
The Special Court did not have Charles Taylor in its custody when it ruled on his 
immunity. He was no longer President of Liberia and was living in exile. Cancelling 
the indictment and the arrest warrant would not have prevented the prosecution 
from simply issuing a new one, as the personal immunity Taylor once enjoyed by 
virtue of his office was gone. The Appeals Chamber acknowledged as much in the 
last paragraph of its decision. It would have been preferable if the Appeals Cham-
ber had examined the law on immunity, concluded that Taylor was personally im-
mune as a Head of State, and ordered the indictment withdrawn. The Chamber 
could have gone on to cite the absence in customary international law of functional 
immunity for crimes of this nature and paved the way for a new indictment. Such 
an approach would have made a pre-emptive strike on any future claim for immu-
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infringed on Ghana’s sovereignty. The Appeals Chamber dismissed this part of Tay-
lor’s application, holding that this was Ghana’s objection to make, and one that 
could not be heard before the Special Court.108 The Appeals Chamber observed that 
since arrest warrants do not execute themselves, Ghana asserted its sovereignty by 
declining to execute the warrant. Finally, the Chamber concluded that even if Tay-
lor was personally immune at the time of the indictment, and if he had succeeded 
in his application, the consequence would have been to compel the Prosecutor to 
issue a fresh warrant, since at the time of the decision Taylor had stepped down as 
President.109 
As of August 11, 2003, when Taylor resigned and went into exile, he no longer en-
joyed personal immunity as President of Liberia. However, when the indictment 
was signed and the arrest warrant issued and transferred to Ghana, Taylor was still 
President. It is worth recalling that a similar situation arose in Congo v. Belgium, 
when Mr. Yerodia ceased to be Minister for Foreign Affairs during the proceedings 
but before the ICJ rendered its judgment. The ICJ, however, reached the opposite 
conclusion. It reasoned that given the nature and purpose of arrest warrants, its 
mere issuance violated the immunity Mr. Yerodia enjoyed by virtue of his posi-
tion and “infringed the immunity from criminal jurisdiction and the inviolability 
then enjoyed by him under international law.”110 If one recalls that the purpose of 
granting personal immunity to Heads of State and other officials is to ensure the ef-
fective performance of their duties—especially when travelling outside their coun-
tries—then the conclusion that an arrest warrant or indictment violates an official’s 
immunity is a sensible one.  
Charles Taylor is a perfect example. At the time of his indictment, he was in Ghana, 
albeit reluctantly, to attend high-level peace talks with other African Heads of State 
and government officials. If the indictment against Taylor had been made public, 
there is little chance he would have agreed to leave Liberia. Releasing the indict-
ment the morning of the peace conference surprised and confused the Ghanaian 
authorities and prompted a stream of criticism from the African leaders in attend-
ance.111 The President of Ghana, John Kufuor, who was also the chairman of the 
Economic Community of West African States, was particularly upset. He publicly 
called for the withdrawal of the indictment and cancelled negotiations to have Fo-
day Sankoh, who was sick, travel to Ghana for medical treatment.112 Sankoh died a 
month later, leading one commentator to observe that Taylor’s indictment became 
Sankoh’s death warrant.113 Moreover, the agreement reached after the peace confer-
ence fell apart within weeks, once Taylor began back-pedalling on his promise to 
resign. This, in turn, led to renewed rebel attacks and frustrated the installment of 
peacekeepers.114 While the interests of justice and the rule of law were crucial, peace 
and an end to the humanitarian crisis in Liberia were felt to be higher priorities. The 
issuing of the indictment and arrest warrant made Taylor hesitant to leave Liberia, 
prejudiced the efforts of the international community to bring peace to Liberia, and 
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may have deprived the Special Court of an opportunity to try the notorious RUF 
leader, Foday Sankoh. 
There was a further complication. Even if Ghana had wanted to, it is highly unlikely 
that it could have lawfully arrested Charles Taylor. As a sitting Head of State, Taylor 
was inviolable and absolutely immune from the criminal jurisdiction of Ghana; the 
country had no legal authority to disregard Taylor’s personal immunity. The Spe-
cial Court’s Prosecutor at the time, David Crane, said that making the indictment 
public during the peace conference in Ghana was intended to bring attention to the 
case against Taylor and pressure him to resign: “with a stroke of the pen, Charles 
Taylor was stripped of his political power before the world.”115 One might suspect 
that Crane was simply trying to save face. The indictment against Taylor was kept 
secret for three months; then, at the exact moment that Taylor’s plane took off for 
Ghana, it was made public. Taylor was under a UN travel ban and rarely left Libe-
ria. One might speculate that Crane saw his only chance to get Taylor and took it, 
hoping Ghana would feel obligated to assist.116 
On the other hand, even if the prosecution believed that Taylor’s position as Head of 
State did not preclude his indictment, they must have known, or at least suspected, 
that his position would prevent Ghana from arresting, detaining, and transferring 
Taylor to the Court. If they did not believe either Ghana legally could hand over 
Taylor or would politically choose to do so, then the timing of the indictment’s re-
lease looks more like a political move. At the time, Crane told the BBC: “The timing 
of this announcement was carefully considered in the light of the important peace 
process begun this week. It is imperative that the attendees know they are dealing 
with an indicted war criminal.”117 If politically motivated, the move may have been 
a questionable one. It was considered by some to be diplomatically naïve and un-
helpful.118 Taylor had announced at the start of the conference that he was willing to 
resign if his resignation would bring peace. Taylor’s war machine was suffering un-
der a UN arms embargo and asset freeze, and the rebels were infiltrating Monrovia. 
This led some analysts to conclude that he was ready to leave and the indictment 
only prolonged the war.119 Upon his return from Ghana, Taylor demanded that the 
indictment against him be dropped as a condition of his resignation. Others point 
to Taylor’s sordid past and his history of saying one thing and doing another in or-
der to conclude that it is unlikely he would have abided by the peace agreement.120 
It is clear that there were competing international demands on (and for) Charles 
Taylor at the time of his indictment. The political process, supported by both Afri-
can and Western leaders, wanted Taylor free and protected so he could participate 
in the peace talks and bring an end to the Liberian conflict. The legal process, how-
ever, had a rare opportunity to apprehend Taylor.121 From either perspective, the in-
dictment’s release was ineffective and possibly even counter-productive. Politically, 
it caused Taylor to renege on his agreement to step down and led to renewed fight-
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ing in the capital during the summer of 2003.122 It is difficult to believe that Taylor 
was driven into exile because of the indictment. Why would Taylor be anxious to 
leave the safe haven of the Presidency? Taylor commenced legal action before both 
the ICJ and the Special Court in the summer of 2003 in an attempt to have the indict-
ment dropped. In the end, Taylor only agreed to accept Nigeria’s offer of asylum on 
the basis that he would not be turned over to the Special Court. It is likely that the 
indictment prolonged the war and made Taylor suspicious of leaving his position 
of relative safety in Monrovia. 
Assuming there was doubt within the Prosecutor’s Office as to the legality of the 
indictment and Ghana’s ability to arrest the President of Liberia, it would have been 
more strategic to keep the indictment sealed until Taylor had resigned. Then his 
personal immunity would have disappeared, and a foreign State (such as Ghana or 
Nigeria) could have lawfully arrested him. While it is debatable whether a foreign 
State would have exercised such power, there would have been no legal hurdle of 
ratione personae to overcome. Furthermore, such a course would have avoided the 
complication involved in an exile agreement stipulating that Nigeria would not 
turn Taylor over to the Special Court. Nigeria has remained good on its word that it 
would only consider surrendering Taylor at the request of a democratically elected 
Liberian President. 
The primary duty and responsibility of the Prosecutor is legal, not political. It would 
be naïve to suggest that politics are not considered in the prosecution of war crimes. 
However, the Special Court is not adequately equipped to pursue politics and di-
plomacy. In a comprehensive evaluation of the Special Court, James Cockayne 
concludes that as an institution, hybrid courts are unable to secure funding, coop-
eration, or support from other States in an effective manner.123 In fact, Cockayne 
concludes, the problem with the Special Court is structural.124 The primary source 
of this structural failure stems from the absence of a Chapter VII mandate.125 From 
such a mandate flow financial support, judicial cooperation, and State assistance; 
Chapter VII powers send a “signal that the international community is serious about 
accountability in a particular situation, and give[s] a tribunal diplomatic clout.”126 
Moreover, tribunals like the Special Court do not have diplomatic staff and, once 
their umbilical cord with the UN is severed, have little recourse to the Security 
Council for assistance.127 Finally, such tribunals involve the UN in both peace and 
justice enterprises in the same country at the same time.128    
A modest staff dedicated to working the diplomatic channels and scouring the po-
litical landscape might have contributed a great deal to the Special Court’s attempts 
to secure Charles Taylor’s attendance. The manner in which the indictment was 

























    supra note 16 at 634–639.
124 Ibid. at 636.
125 Ibid. at 636.



















Chapter VII resolution to force Nigeria to hand over Taylor. Ultimately they were unsuccessful, largely because 
Nigeria had done the international community a favour and could not now be humiliated by a Chapter VII 
resolution. For more on this campaign, see Lang, supra at note 21.
128 Cockayne,
    supra note 16 at 637.
442007
emailed to the embassy in the morning with, one is led to believe, little or no ad-
vance discussion, requests, or warnings. This was hardly a diplomatic means of 
securing cooperation and could not have been well received. Advance discussion 
could have led to a satisfactory compromise: the indictment’s release could have 
been suspended until the political process had played itself out, peace was secured, 
and Taylor was outside of Liberia. Perhaps such covert discussions took place, al-
though with the confusion that followed the release of the indictment, this seems 
unlikely. There is no guarantee such efforts would bear fruit, but without a Chapter 
VII backing, they were not given a meaningful chance of success.
After Charles Taylor went into exile, it appeared that he was beyond the reach of the 
Special Court. While many human rights groups and activists cried foul, the politi-
cal consensus was that Nigeria had done the international community a favour by 
taking Taylor. In February of 2005, the Office of the Prosecutor began a behind-the-
scenes campaign to exert political pressure on Nigeria to hand over Taylor.129 Its 
goal was an enforceable Chapter VII resolution from the Security Council. While 
that was never achieved, the Office of the Prosecutor was able to secure consen-
sus among Security Council members that Taylor should be handed over—yet the 
members could not agree on an approach for doing so. The modest success of this 
campaign underscores the need for diplomatic influence and expertise in hybrid 
tribunals.
CONCLUSION
International criminal law is characterized by the existence of multiple legal re-
gimes, including domestic law, customary international law, and the law of inter-
national criminal tribunals.130 The concept of personal immunity for Heads of State 
does not have uniform application across these discrete regimes. As this paper has 
endeavoured to show, customary international law, as applied primarily in domes-
tic courts, recognizes the personal immunity enjoyed by Heads of State. Any di-
vergence from this general rule is more accurately characterized as a discrete legal 
regime than as an exception.131 A given international tribunal may, depending on 
its regime, apply a different international law from domestic courts and even from 
other tribunals. For example, the immunity provisions in the ad hoc tribunals and 
the Rome Statute are significantly different from each other, and, this author would 
argue, the former remove only functional immunity while the latter remove both 
functional and personal immunities. 
The regime of international law created by the Special Court is a discrete regime 
that includes Sierra Leone and the UN as an organization. It is a relatively small 
regime compared to the ICTY and ICTR, which, by virtue of their Chapter VII man-
date, capture all of the member States of the UN. As an international organization, 
the Special Court is bound by customary international law, but the regime created 
by its constitutive instrument may depart from, codify, or supplement customary 
law. Thus, it is not unlike the relationship between the common law and statu-
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tory law; the latter may overrule, codify, expand, or restrict the former. Therefore, 
when considering the application of personal immunity to an individual, the first 
consideration is whether the individual is captured by the particular regime—by 
virtue of a Chapter VII resolution, consent or some third-party provision.132 The 
central weakness of the Appeals Chamber’s decision was its failure to establish how 
Liberia was brought into the regime created by the Special Court and the degree to 
which that legal regime lifted the immunity enjoyed by incumbent Heads of State 
and other high-ranking government officials at customary law. 
The attempts by the Special Court to obtain Charles Taylor demonstrate the role 
politics plays in international criminal law. Political and legal processes in this area 
often intersect and often have conflicting goals. One could argue that international 
criminal law can only do what is politically palatable, as political considerations are 
often paramount to legal ones. Even the ICC, whose very genesis may represent the 
minimization of politics in international criminal law, is plagued by illegitimacy if 
it is unable to secure the consent of major internal actors. Securing Charles Taylor’s 
appearance before the Special Court was primarily a political issue with legal hur-
dles. International courts—and particularly hybrid tribunals—require diplomatic 
staff and political savvy if they are to fulfill the purposes for which they are created. 
It is important to remember that Charles Taylor is before the Special Court today 
because of a political process that resulted in Liberia’s request to Nigeria for Taylor’s 
transfer.133 Nigeria, ever suspicious of the jurisdiction of the Special Court, was only 
willing to fly Taylor back to Liberia where UNMIL arrested and transported him to 
the Special Court. Although it was an enthusiastic recipient, the Court was unable 
to trigger the political process itself. This must not be taken as its own failure. If the 
international community wants to do better, it must have the courage to endow its 
institutions with the power and capacity to do what it asks them to do. 
Another conclusion drawn from this analysis is that hybrid courts should not be 
established where the conflict is not well contained within the host State. If sus-
pects, witnesses, evidence, and victims extend beyond State borders, hybrid courts 
established between the UN and the host State are simply not an effective institu-
tional mechanism to achieve justice. This point is not merely academic. The UN 
and Lebanon may be making such a mistake with the proposed establishment of 
a hybrid tribunal to try those responsible for the assassination of Rafik Hariri.134 It 
is likely that perpetrators, conspirators, witnesses, and evidence in the Hariri case 
are located outside of Lebanon and beyond the reach of the proposed tribunal’s 
jurisdiction, which, like the Special Court, will be limited to the host State. If the 
tribunal’s prosecutions are frustrated by third-party States, its only recourse will be 
to the UN Security Council or other international political processes. The proposed 
tribunal, like the Special Court, will be largely at the mercy of other international 
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some evidence of the emergence of a trend lifting the personal immunity of Heads 
of State for international crimes. It is clear that this modest trend has not developed 
into a customary rule, as the domestic courts of several countries have been consist-
ent in upholding the immunity of Heads of State and other officials. There is little 
doubt that the ICC has the legal authority to indict and prosecute a sitting Head of 
State provided that country is a party to the Rome Statute. Whether it has the politi-
cal wherewithal to do so is a separate question. The bulk of academic commentary 
opines that the ICC is unable to prosecute a Head of State or high-ranking official 
from a non-member State. The Special Court of Sierra Leone, while apparently will-
ing to indict an incumbent head of a third-party state, lacked the legal authority to 
do so—demonstrating that sometimes, ambition can exceed capacity.
Charles Taylor will be tried by the Special Court for Sierra Leone in the Nether-
lands. The immunity he once enjoyed as President of Liberia is gone and his status 
as a former Head of State should not bar his prosecution, although he will likely 
argue that it should. The Special Court finally has the person who may be the most 
responsible for the decade of horror that engulfed much of West Africa and contin-
ues to shape and define the politics of peace and war in the region. As desirable as 
the outcome may be, the legal path by which Taylor traveled to justice is fraught 
with dubious decisions and unconvincing analysis. What the final assessment of 
the Special Court for Sierra Leone and its prosecution of Charles Taylor will be is 
impossible to predict. However, the attempts to indict, arrest, and transfer Charles 
Taylor in the spring and summer of 2003 are symptoms of “shoestring justice” and 
the lessons learned from the experience should not be overlooked, despite the final 
success of Taylor’s likely imminent prosecution.
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